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Abstract 
[Excerpt] As UFCW international and local leaders know from first hand experience, there have been 
dramatic changes in the retail grocery industry over the past 15 years. Of most direct relevance to the 
collective bargaining environment, the absolute size of key corporations has increased and economic 
power in the industry has become more concentrated. Influenced by the spread of Wal-Mart's grocery 
operations, established companies like Kroger, Safeway, Supervalu, and Loblaw have pursued aggressive 
merger and market expansion strategies. Further complicating the situation has been the success of 
other alternative format grocers (such as Costco, Trader Joe's, Whole Foods, and BJ's), and the entry and 
expanding influence of global corporations. Clearly, the competitive nature of the market has been 
irrevocably altered. 
Another aspect of the change in the collective bargaining environment has been the decline in the relative 
strength that the UFCW brings to the collective bargaining table. While the UFCW's total membership 
numbers have marginally slipped over the past decade, the power of the key industry employers, as noted 
above, has vastly increased. As a result, the UFCW's "core industry power" in retail food has ebbed. 
These evolving economic realities have provided the rationale for corporate labor relations strategies that 
are hard-nosed, antagonistic and transcend traditional local market dynamics, which formerly were the 
critical factor in the character of negotiations. 
Keywords 
grocery industry, collective bargaining, unionization, negotiation, United Food and Commercial Workers 
International Union, UFCW 
Disciplines 
Collective Bargaining | Labor Relations | Unions 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Hurd, R. W. (2008). Collective bargaining in the era of grocery industry restructuring [Electronic version]. 
Washington, DC: United Food and Commercial Workers International Union. 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/284/ 
Required Publisher Statement 
Reprinted with permission of the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/284 
Collective Bargaining 
in the Era 
of Grocery Industry 
Restructuring 
Richard W.Hurd 
Professor of Labor Studies 
Cornell University 
July 2, 2008 
As UFCW international and local leaders know 
from first hand experience, there have been dramatic 
changes in the retail grocery industry over the past 15 
years. Of most direct relevance to the collective 
bargaining environment, the absolute size of key 
corporations has increased and economic power in 
the industry has become more concentrated. 
Influenced by the spread of Wal-Mart's grocery 
operations, established companies like Kroger, 
Safeway, Supervalu, and Loblaw have pursued 
aggressive merger and market expansion strategies. 
Further complicating the situation has been the 
success of other alternative format grocers (such as 
Costco, Trader Joe's, Whole Foods, and BJ's), and 
the entry and expanding influence of global 
corporations. Clearly, the competitive nature of the 
market has been irrevocably altered. 
Another aspect of the change in the collective 
bargaining environment has been the decline in the 
relative strength that the UFCW brings to the 
collective bargaining table. While the UFCW's total 
membership numbers have marginally slipped over 
the past decade, the power of the key industry 
employers, as noted above, has vastly increased. As 
a result, the UFCW's "core industry power" in retail 
food has ebbed. 
These evolving economic realities have provided 
the rationale for corporate labor relations strategies 
that are hard-nosed, antagonistic and transcend 
traditional local market dynamics, which formerly 
were the critical factor in the character of negotiations. 
Unions appropriately adopt structures and shape 
bargaining strategies in reaction to the economic 
realities in the industries where they represent 
workers. In retail food, the compelling economic unit 
used to be the local market area. Employers' 
profitability was based on their ability to compete 
successfully in the geographic market areas where 
they operated. All of the major unionized companies 
started in specific local geographic markets, and from 
the earliest days of the industry in the early part of 
the 20th Century into the 1990s, they would conduct 
collective bargaining on a market by market basis. 
As long as their labor costs were competitive within 
their market areas, the companies typically would not 
be aggressive bargainers. Even as they entered new 
local markets through organic growth or acquisitions, 
the companies continued the practice of market 
by market collective bargaining. In this economic 
environment, the UFCW local union in each market 
could effectively bargain for its members. 
However, in the context of the industry transfor-
mation that is underway early in the 21st century, 
neither the union's traditional decentralized bargaining 
structure nor its locally driven bargaining strategy ap-
pears to be the appropriate response to the current 
industry structure. While local unions were at one 
time capable of inflicting serious economic pain on 
(Continued) 
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recalcitrant grocers (or delivering 
the opportunity for economic 
gain to cooperative grocers), 
corporate growth has insulated 
many of the key actors in the 
industry from the impact of direct 
union action that is limited to the 
local level. It is unlikely that 
traditional approaches can still 
deliver sustainable economic 
advantage to UFCW members 
even in those geographic markets 
with high union density. The 
question UFCW leaders have 
started to address is how to 
confront national employers as a 
unified international union that brings more union 
power to the table. 
Company Size and 
Market Concentration 
The largest grocery retailers have all grown 
substantially over the past ten years. Most dramatic is 
Wal-Mart's 700 percent increase in grocery sales. Only 
20 years after opening its first super center, Wal-Mart 
is now the top U.S. grocery retailer with over 22 
percent of the national market, nearly double the 
share of Kroger which ranks number two. Needless to 
say, Wal-Mart's entry into retail food changed the 
competitive landscape, and the traditional companies 
that are still in a position to compete with Wal-Mart 
have responded with aggressive growth and 
acquisition strategies. Naturally, with all of the 
largest firms expanding, 
economic power in the 
market is now much 
more concentrated. The 
top five U.S. grocers 
account for over half of 
total sales. Although 
spared from the massive 
direct competition with 
Wal-Mart, Canada ' s 
largest grocers also have 
embraced the growth 
and acquisitions strategy 
in part to prepare for 
the Wal-Mart onslaught 
they expect. As a result, 
market concentration has 
grown in Canada as well. 
Increased firm size 
and greater industry 
As the major 
companies have 
grown, the balance 
of power in collective 
bargaining has been 
shifting cut 'ay from 
the UFCW. 
concentra t ion along with a 
stagnant UFCW membership 
translate into greater leverage 
in the collective bargaining 
arena for unionized companies. 
See Chart 1 below. 
Of most direct relevance to 
the UFCW is the absolute growth 
of these companies in relation to 
the lack of growth of the UFCW. 
Kroger's growth (measured by 
total annual revenue) is up 179 
percent over the past ten years. 
Other unionized firms have 
recorded similar growth: Loblaw 
at 244 percent; Ahold at 183 
percent; Supervalu at 156 percent; and Safeway at 88 
percent. As the major companies have grown, the 
balance of power in collective bargaining has been 
shifting away from the UFCW. The shift is due to the 
fact that as the major chains have extended their 
geographic reach, each local market area has come 
to count for a smaller part of the companies' 
revenues and profits. Therefore, each local 
bargaining agreement now represents a smaller share 
of each company's operations, and union leverage is 
reduced proportionally. 
The Local Impact 
of Corporate Restructuring 
In the new economic landscape of grocery 
retailing, the UFCW's relative standing has declined 
in individual markets and overall. The day-to-day 
Chart 1: UFCW Membership Levels Fail to Keep 
Pace with Growth of Core Industry Leaders 
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appearance of the bargaining relationship with the 
employer looks the same, with the same UFCW 
locals and usually the same basic contracts (although 
the terms of the agreements have changed). But, the 
consolidation of the companies has shifted power 
and leverage away from the union. A few examples 
demonstrate the new reality. 
In New England, Stop & Shop is now owned by 
Ahold. When the UFCW bargained with the 
independent Stop & Shop prior to 1996, it had the 
ability to shut down the entire company. By contrast, 
Stop & Shop accounts for only 28 percent of Ahold's 
total revenues in the U.S. (and an even smaller share 
of global revenues). The union still has the ability to 
bargain with Stop & Shop, but 
it is not possible for local(s) 
representing 28 percent of a 
company to exert as much 
leverage as when it represented 
100 percent. 
In Philadelphia, the story 
is similar for Acme. Long the 
market leader in the Philadelphia 
area, the Acme chain became a 
smaller and smaller part of larger 
acquiring companies over the 
years. Then, two years ago, 
Acme became part of newly 
national company, Supervalu. 
Acme now only accounts for 5 
percent of Supervalu's revenues. 
Likewise, Dominick's in Chicago 
was independent until 1995, but 
now represents only 5 percent of 
Safeway's revenues. In Southern California, the story 
for Ralph's is the same. Local UFCW bargaining used 
to impact 100 percent of Ralph's operations, but now 
Ralph's represents only 6.5 percent of Kroger's total 
revenues. Even in Kroger's home city of Cincinnati, 
the union's position has weakened. With Kroger's 
rapid expansion over the past decade, the revenue 
generated in the Cincinnati market now has an 
impact that is 60 percent less than in 1995. 
Although the details vary by geographic market 
area, the experience is the same. The relative power 
of each UFCW bargaining unit in the major chains 
has been seriously eroded by the growth of the 
chains and the UFCWs failure to grow. So vast is the 
corporate growth that in most instances an individual 
bargaining unit accounts for no more than half the 
revenue of ten years ago. For the former independent 
grocers that have merged or been acquired, bargaining 
units have lost far more leverage. The reduced 
potential impact of local union direct action on total 
We question UFCW 
leaders bare started 
to address is bow 
employers as a 
unified international 
union that brings 
more union power 
to the table. 
revenues has encouraged companies to become 
aggressive in negotiations and even to initiate battles 
in local market areas where the UFCW used to be 
strong. 
The New Economic Landscape— 
How Should the UFCW Respond? 
Wal-Mart's entry into retail food and its rapid 
expansion changed the competitive landscape. 
Threatened by new competition from Wal-Mart and 
the other alternative format grocers, the major chains 
have responded with a centralized, systematic 
reevaluation of the full range of business practices: 
mergers and acquisitions, finance, 
store format, marketing and labor 
relations. The successful chains 
have pursued an aggressive 
strategy of market expansion with 
a simultaneous determination to 
secure cost savings that would 
allow them to compete more 
effectively. This determination has 
been a tremendous driver of the 
companies' offensive against labor 
standards established by the 
UFCW. The market expansion 
initiatives and other revised 
business practices have been 
successful; the major companies 
are in robust financial shape and 
in control of their markets. 
Despite this, they continue to 
argue that the significant nation-
wide power of Wal-Mart leaves them no alternative to 
seeking continued reductions in cost. Low-wage, non-
union Wal-Mart provides the most convenient—albeit 
greatly exaggerated—rationale for the attack on UFCW 
contracts and standards. Each contract negotiation 
presents the companies with an opportunity to wrest 
savings that will enlarge profits and fund the 
ongoing market battles against Wal-Mart and other new 
competitors. As long as the companies achieve a large 
enough future stream of cost savings at the collective 
bargaining table, the new industry dynamics make 
localized actions—even lengthy strikes—a potentially 
cost effective proposition. 
The transformed economic realities of the retail 
grocery industry have made it imperative for the 
UFCW to re-examine its collective bargaining structure 
and strategy. The increased coordination and local 
union cooperation that has been promoted by the 
national union in recent rounds of negotiations is 
fully appropriate and a step in the right direction. As 
(Continued) 
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Tloe increased coordination and local union cooperation, 
in recent rounds of negotiations is fully appropriate 
and a step in the right direction. 
suggested by The Committee on the Future of the 
UFCW in its report One Union—One Voice, there is a 
clear economic imperative to "promote comprehensive 
bargaining strategies," based on "strategic com-
prehensive bargaining plans," and incorporating "com-
prehensive contract mobilization.. .to bring maximum 
pressure on employers." The situation is extremely 
serious, however, and suggests an even more 
dramatic realignment of strategy 
and structure with an emphasis on 
centralizing collective bargaining 
efforts through greater coordinated 
local/international cooperative 
strategic planning and execution. 
Although the challenges are 
substantial, they also present an 
exciting opportunity. Intense eco-
nomic pressures and centralization 
of corporate strategy decisions are 
not unique to the retail grocery 
industry, but rather are typical in 
the evolving global economy. In 
this context, non-union firms and 
multinational corporations have 
been the innovators in employee 
relations, while unionized firms 
have reacted by mimicking their 
strategies, attempting to impose 
non-union standards on their 
unionized workforce. Although the 
specific experiences vary, the 
developments faced by the UFCW in the U.S. and 
Canada are similar to those in other unionized 
industries, including hotels, telecommunications, 
airlines, automobile manufacturing, general services 
contracting, and entertainment. 
The UFCW has worked hard to restructure and 
realign its operations to maximize future opportuni-
Tloe UFCW is in 
a position to build 
on the process set 
in motion by The 
Committee on the 
Future and develop 
21st century struc-
tures and strategies 
that re-establish the 
union's bargaining 
power. 
ties and is expected to further address these issues at 
their upcoming convention in August 2008. 
Two of the most important issues that the union 
will address are how the union intends to maximize 
and allocate future resources for organizing efforts in 
core industries, including retail grocery, and how they 
can solidify the coordination and cooperation that 
is needed at every level of the union as it confronts 
collective bargaining in a 
centralized corporate environment. 
The economic reality is that all 
unions today, including the 
UFCW, must devote substantially 
more resources toward organizing 
and growth-focused initiatives 
and better coordinate their 
approach to collective bargaining 
if they expect to level the playing 
field in the industries in which 
they operate. The ones that do will 
be well positioned for the future. 
The UFCW is in a position 
to build on the process set in 
motion by The Committee on the 
Future and develop 21st century 
structures and strategies that 
re-establish the union's bargaining 
power. Decisions reached as 
the UFCW works to refine its 
approach to strengthening bar-
gaining power have the potential 
to influence union practice well beyond the retail 
grocery industry. If the UFCW rises to the challenge, 
it can set the standard for the entire labor movement 
in adapting to economic change, and ultimately have 
a positive impact on the future of unions and the 
role of working people in the economies of the U.S. 
and Canada. 
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